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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 890087-CA 
vs. : 
ADDAM SWAPP, : Category No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction and final judgment 
entered against Defendant in Third Judicial District Court, in 
and for Summit County, the Honorable Michael Murphy, Judge, 
presiding. On December 22, 1988, Defendant was found guilty by a 
jury of the offense of Criminal Homicide, Manslaughter, a second 
degree felony, as described in Utah Code Ann. §76-5-205 (1990). 
Sentence was imposed on January 26, 1989. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in denying Defendant's 
Motion For Bill of Particulars? 
The standard of review is whether the trial court 
abused its discretion. State v. Riddle, 112 Utah 356, 188 P.2d 
449 (1948). 
Should the Court find error, the standard of review 
would be the harmless error standard of Rule 30 of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure. The standard would be whether, absent the 
error, there was a reasonable likelihood of a result more 
favorable to the accused, that is, whether the Court's confidence 
in the outcome of the trial is eroded. The Defendant bears the 
burden of making a credible argument that his defense was 
impaired by the error. If he does so, the State then bears the 
burden of persuasion that such error was harmless under Rule 30. 
State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100 (Utah 1988). 
2. Did the trial court err in interpreting §76-3-
401(4) to permit sentencing Defendant to one to fifteen years in 
the Utah State Prison to run consecutively to his federal 
sentences, with the limitation that the aggregate maximum of both 
state and federal sentences could not exceed thirty years? 
The standard of review applicable to interpretation of 
law is that the Court accords the trial court's conclusions of 
law no particular deference but reviews them for correctness. 
Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985); City of 
Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused 
shall have the right . . . to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusation against 
him [and] to have a copy thereof. . . . 
Rule 4(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure: 
(e) When facts not set out in an 
information or indictment are required to 
inform a defendant of the nature and cause of 
the offense charged, so as to enable him to 
prepare his defense, the defendant may file a 
written motion for a bill of particulars... 
The request for and contents of a bill of 
particulars shall be limited to a statement 
of factual information needed to set forth 
the essential elements of the particular 
offense charged. 
Criminal responsibility for direct commission of 
offense or for conduct of another, Utah Code Ann. §76-2-202 
(1990): 
Every person, acting with the mental 
state required for the commission of an 
offense who directly commits the offense, who 
solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or 
intentionally aids another person to engage 
in conduct which constitutes an offense shall 
be criminally liable as a party for such 
conduct. 
Concurrent or consecutive sentences - Limitations, Utah 
Code Ann. §76-3-401(4) (1978) (amended 1989): 
(4) If a court lawfully determined to 
impose consecutive sentences, the aggregate 
minimum of all sentences imposed may not 
exceed twelve years' imprisonment and the 
aggregate maximum of all sentences imposed 
may not exceed thirty years' imprisonment... 
Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree, Utah 
Code Ann. §76-5-203 (1990): 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder 
in the second degree if the actor: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes 
the death of another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily 
injury to another, he commits an act 
clearly dangerous to human life that 
causes the death of another; 
(c) acting under circumstances 
evidencing a depraved indifference to 
human life, he engages in conduct which 
creates a grave risk of death to 
another and thereby causes the death of 
another; or.•• 
Criminal Homicide, Manslaughter, Utah Code Ann. §76-5-
205(1) (1990): 
Criminal homicide constitutes 
manslaughter if the actor: 
(a) recklessly causes the death of 
another; or 
(b) causes the death of another under 
the influence of extreme emotion disturbance 
for which there is a reasonable explanation 
or excuse; or 
(c)causes the death of another under 
circumstances where the actor reasonably 
believes the circumstances provide a legal 
justification or excuse for his conduct 
although the conduct is not legally 
justifiable or excusable under the existing 
circumstances. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant, his brother Jonathan Swapp, and John 
Timothy Singer were charged with one count of Criminal Homicide, 
Murder in the Second Degree, a violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-
203 (1990) (R. 2-5). Trial commenced on November 25, 1988, in 
Summit County, Utah (R. 746). The jury returned its verdicts on 
December 22, 1988 (R. 990-993). Defendant and John Timothy 
Singer were convicted of the lesser and included offense of 
Criminal Homicide, Manslaughter, a violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§76-5-205 (1990) (R. 1092, 1094). Jonathan Swapp was convicted 
of Negligent Homicide, a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206 
(1990) (R. 1093). On January 26, 1989, the Defendant was 
sentenced to a term of not less than one year nor more than 15 
years in the Utah State Prison, said term to run consecutively to 
and at the end of any and all determinate sentences imposed in 
United States v. Addam W. Swapp, Case No. 88-CR-006J, United 
States District Court for the District of Utah, with the 
limitation that, in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401(4) 
(1978) (amended 1989), the aggregate maximum term of all 
sentences imposed in the instant case and the federal case in no 
event exceed thirty (30) years (R. 1422-1426). John Timothy 
Singer was also sentenced to 1-15 years in prison, to be served 
consecutively to his federal sentence (R. 1417-1421). Jonathan 
Swapp was sentenced for the Class A misdemeanor offense of 
Negligent Homicide to one year in jail consecutive to his federal 
sentence (R. 1427-1431). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the early morning hours of January 16, 1988, Max 
Lewis, who resided across the street from the Marion Stake 
Center, in Marion, Utah, was awakened by a loud noise and the 
shaking of his house (Tr. 12-2, pp. 88) . Later that morning, 
when he went to the parking lot of the Stake Center to plow snow, 
Lewis noticed that the building had been severely damaged (Tr. 
12-2, pp. 88-89). Detective Robert Berry of the Summit County 
Sheriff's Office responded to the scene and located a large 
carved pole that had been wired to a fence on the east side of 
the Stake Center. The pole had been painted red and bore an 
inscription (Tr. 12-2, pp. 95-96). 
Near the pole, Detective Berry observed a trail in the 
snow. It consisted of several footprints proceeding in an east-
west direction. He followed the trail through a field and 
Transcript references refer to the date the evidence was taken. 
ultimately to the property occupied by the extended family of 
Vickie Singer (Tr. 12-2, pp. 96-97). Officers did not enter that 
Singer property (Tr. 12-2, p. 103). This was because several 
months earlier, on October 29, 1987, Summit County Sheriff Fred 
Ely had been ordered off the property by Defendant Addam Swapp, 
who had pointed handguns in the direction of the sheriff and a 
deputy, and fired a shot into the air as the officers were 
leaving, warning them not to come onto the property again (Tr. 
12-2, pp. 120-123). On the same day, Deputy Joe Offret of the 
Summit County Sheriff's Office contacted Defendant by phone, who 
reiterated his earlier warning, stating that if officers came on 
to the property blood would be spilled and it wouldn't be his 
(Tr. 12-2, 138-141). 
After Detective Berry followed the footprints to the 
Singer property, federal authorities were contacted (Tr. 12-2, 
pp. 102-103). F.B.I. Agent Calvin Clegg was able to make 
telephonic contact with the Defendant, who did not deny his 
involvement in the bombing. Defendant quoted extensively from 
scripture and indicated that his God was angry, stating that the 
scriptures were replete with references that God would pour out 
his wrath against the people who strike out against the Church of 
God (Tr. 12-2, PP. 156-157). Clegg informed Defendant that the 
property was surrounded and that law enforcement wanted a 
peaceful solution (Tr. 12-2, p. 158). Clegg told Defendant he 
was concerned about the children (Tr. 12-2, p. 158). Defendant 
told Clegg that he had expected the confrontation and that the 
family was prepared for a siege and could hold out for months 
(Tr. 12-2, p. 158). After a 19-minute discussion, Defendant 
terminated the conversation (Tr. 12-2, pp. 158-159). 
The day after the bombing, Defendant telephoned Chad 
Gibbs, a news reporter for KUTV news in Salt Lake City. 
Defendant acknowledged he had left at the site of the bombing a 
red pole which included the inscription "Church, state and nation 
shall now be destroyed" (Tr. 12-2, pp. 203-205). In his prepared 
statement, Defendant made scriptural references to the Lord 
fighting their battles and the sword falling on their enemies 
(Tr. 12-2, p. 208). 
Over the ensuing thirteen days numerous federal law 
enforcement agents were assigned to the standoff at Marion, Utah. 
Due to the presence of a number of young children (Exhibit P-19), 
strict rules of engagement were imposed upon the officers. Under 
no circumstances was the Singer residence to be fired upon, even 
if officers themselves were under fire from the house (Tr. 12-2, 
pp. 234-235). 
At various times throughout the standoff, law 
enforcement authorities set up lights and played loud noises 
through speaker systems. The speakers were not used until 
approximately one week into the standoff (Tr. 12-5, p. 98; Tr. 
12-14, p. 219). The placement of the lights and speakers was 
undertaken at the suggestion of Duane Fuselier, an FBI Agent and 
psychologist who was brought to the scene to help bring a 
peaceful end to the crisis. He suggested the use of the lights 
for security and tactical reasons, and felt the noise would be a 
way of prodding the family to at least communicate with the 
officers (Tr. 12-5, pp. 97-98). 
Throughout the standoff, Defendant and Jonathan Swapp 
openly carried firearms when they were outside the residence 
(Tr. 12-5, pp. 7-8, 26-28, 30-31, 39-47) (Exhibits 12 to 19). 
Firearms were discharged from the Singer property on numerous 
occasions. Several times rounds were fired from the Singer 
residence and elsewhere at lights, generators and other equipment 
set up to assist in the effort to bring the standoff to an end. 
At times, shots were fired at positions occupied by federal 
officers (Tr. 12-5, pp. 8-9, 15-16; Tr. 12-2, 248-249, Tr. 12-7, 
235-236). On two occasions, Jonathan Swapp pointed his rifle in 
the direction of FBI agents (Tr. 12-2, p. 251; Tr. 12-5, p. 47). 
On one occasion, an F.B.I, agent observed John Timothy Singer 
outside the back door of the Singer house in his wheelchair in 
possession of a rifle (Tr. 12-5, p. 44). 
Authorities continued to try to negotiate with the 
occupants of the property. On January 20, 1988, a letter from 
the ATF Special Agent in charge, Nolan Douglas, was dropped onto 
the property from a helicopter (Tr. 12-2, pp. 219-220). The 
letter stated that Addam Swapp and Vickie Singer had been 
indicted by a federal grand jury, that arrest warrants were 
outstanding for the two, and that a federal judge had ordered 
them to immediately come out. Douglas expressed concern for the 
family, especially the children, and encouraged the family to 
pick up the telephone and talk to work the situation out 
peacefully (Exhibit C-2). The family gave no response to 
Douglas' letter (Tr. 12-14, p. 228). 
On January 25, 1988, Odgen Kraut, a friend of the 
Singer family, was allowed onto the property to act as an 
intermediary (Tr. 12-5, pp. 231-234). He went in on three 
occasions. On his first visit, Kraut asked Defendant Addam Swapp 
why he had guns, and if he intended to shoot anyone. Defendant 
responded, "No, not unless they come over the fence." He told 
Kraut that part of his revelation was that there would be a 
confrontation and bloodshed there (Tr. 12-5, p. 242), and that 
the family was expecting John Singer to be resurrected from the 
dead as a result of the confrontation with the authorities (Tr. 
12-5, p. 239). 
The following day, on January 26, 1988, ten days into 
the standoff, the authorities had Kraut deliver a letter from 
Utah Governor Norman Bangerter to the family, urging the 
occupants to peacefully end the standoff, if only for the sake of 
the small children who were inside the Singer residence with 
Defendant Swapp (Exhibit C-8). Kraut described Addam as being 
armed like a "Mexican bandito" with a band of bullets across his 
chest and waist, a pistol on each side, a long knife and a rifle. 
Kraut told Defendant it was not his mission to make war (Tr. 12-
5, p. 251). Kraut returned the next day, January 27, 1988, and 
was given handwritten letters to the Governor from Defendant 
Addam Swapp and from Vickie Singer (Tr. 12-5, pp. 260-262). On 
either his second or third visit, Kraut told Defendant that he 
would "either have a big revelation up here or a catastrophe," to 
which Defendant responded, "That's right." (Tr. 12-5, p. 253) 
In his letter to the Governor, Defendant stated that he 
did not recognize the authority of the government, and declared 
the Singer property an independent nation. He commanded law 
enforcement to leave the valley immediately, threatening 
destruction in the name of the Lord. In the P.S. to the letter 
he stated: "TAKE A WARNING - any man of yours who attempts to 
cross the Boundaries of this place, without our Permission, will 
be treated as an agressive (sic) act on your part against us and 
we will defend ourselves in any manner we see fit. . . . " 
(Exhibit C-9, page 6) (Tr. 12-5, pp. 114-120). 
Discouraged by the letters they received, officers 
decided to attempt an arrest. Their belief was that Defendant 
was the leader on the property (Tr. 12-5, p. 141), and that if he 
was captured, the other family members would surrender and the 
standoff would end, which proved prophetic (Tr. 12-5, pp. 123-
125; Tr. 12-14, p. 274-275). 
The first arrest plan involved the use of the noise 
producing speakers as decoys. The agents were aware that when 
noise had previously been broadcast, the Swapp brothers would 
venture off the property and disable the speakers by firing into 
them. Members of the FBI Hostage Rescue Team and Utah State 
Corrections Department dog handlers would be in the area when the 
Swapp brothers left the property. The dogs would be released and 
take down the Swapp brothers (Tr. 12-5, p. 289-292). When the 
speakers were activated the Swapp brothers did respond as 
anticipated (Tr. 12-5, pp. 298-299). However, when the dogs were 
released they did not attack the Swapp brothers. One of the dogs 
began to attack one of the agents, the other ran a few yards and 
returned to his handler. After disabling the speakers by 
shooting them with firearms, the Swapps retreated to the Singer 
house (Tr. 12-7, pp. 232-233, 251). 
In conjunction with this first plan, several F.B.I, 
agents assigned to the Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) and Corrections 
dog handler Fred House had entered the house on the west side of 
the Singer property, known as the Bates house, at about 10:00 
p.m. on January 27 (Tr. 12-7, pp. 9-10). Agents had previously 
observed family members, including the Swapp brothers, enter the 
house during the previous twelve days. In the event that the 
Swapp brothers entered the Bates house on the morning of the 
28th, agents would be in a position to effect an arrest (Tr. 12-
5, pp. 291). 
When the first arrest attempt failed, a second plan was 
put into effect. The agents were aware that the Swapp brothers 
went to milk the family goat every morning. The goat pen was 
located approximately one-half way between the Bates and Singer 
houses. The new plan was to release the dogs from the front door 
of the Bates house as the Swapp brothers left the goat pen. The 
dogs were to take the Swapps to the ground, after which the 
officers would move in and effect the arrest without the 
necessity of firing a shot (Tr. 12-6, pp. 37, 41). 
At about 8:30 a.m. on January 28, 1988, Defendant and 
Jonathan Swapp left the Singer house to milk the goat. As usual, 
both were armed. Utah Department of Corrections dog handlers 
Jerry Pope and Fred House moved to the front door of the Bates 
house when the Swapp brothers approached the goat pen (Tr. 12-6, 
vol II, p. 76). After they finished the milking, they began 
walking from the goat pen located midway between the Bates home 
and the Singer house towards the Singer house. The door was 
opened and the dogs were released. At that time, F.B.I, agents 
John Butler and Martin Brown were positioned behind Pope and 
House to provide cover (Tr. 12-7, p. 150-151). Butler and Brown 
were armed with 9mm rifles (Tr. 12-7, p. 134). Agents David 
Edward and Richard Intellini, also armed, were lying prone on a 
second floor landing of the Bates house looking out a window that 
faced the Singer house (Tr. 12-7, pp. 22-24). 
As the dogs were released, Lt. House was crouched 
slightly in the doorway with his right side exposed to the Singer 
house (Tr. 12-7, p. 184). Shortly after the dogs were released, 
gunfire erupted from the Singer house. A volley of three shots 
was fired (Exhibit E-4). Almost simultaneously, agents in the 
Bates house observed Defendant Addam Swapp pull his 30-06 rifle 
off his shoulder, spin around to face the Bates house, and bring 
his rifle into a firing position. Agents Butler and Intellini 
each fired one shot almost simultaneously at Defendant Swapp, who 
fell to the ground (Tr. 12-7, pp. 156-160; Tr. 12-6, p. 94; Tr. 
12-7, p. 29). Agent Butler's round entered Defendant's wrist, 
traveled through his arm into his chest and lodged in his back 
(Tr. 12-14, pp. 86-90). Agent Intellini's round struck the 
inside of a window frame in the Bates house (Tr. 12-6, p. 95). 
After firing his shot, Agent Butler grabbed Pope and pulled him 
into the stairwell (Tr. 12-7, p. 160). 
Just after the agents fired, a series of four and then 
three rounds (Exhibit E-4) were fired from the Singer house and 
the northeast corner of the house. Just before the last volley, 
FBI Agent Hal Metcalf, who was looking out a window in the Jepsen 
home to the west of the Bates house, saw Jonathan Swapp kneeling 
at the northeast corner of the Singer house, pointing a rifle in 
his direction. Agent Metcalf dove for cover as rounds hit the 
Jepsen home (Tr. 12-7, p. 205; Tr. 12-8, p. 17). 
Shortly after the gunfire erupted, agents noticed that 
Fred House had been hit and had slumped to the ground (Tr. 12-6, 
vol. II, p. 37). Agent Intellini called out to him to hold on, 
that they'd get him out of there (Tr. 12-6, p. 96). The dogs, 
who had become disoriented and apparently never keyed on the 
Swapp brothers, re-entered the Bates house as Agent Hugh McKinney 
made his way down the stairs to give House first aid (Tr. 12-7, 
pp. 29-30). About that same time more shots were hitting the 
partially open front door (Tr. 12-7, pp. 99-100). Lt. House had 
slumped back into a closet near the doorway with his feet 
blocking the doorway (Tr. 12-7, p. 162). While making his way to 
Lt. House, McKinney, lying prone, heard the snap of bullets 
passing over his head (Tr. 12-7, P. 113). McKinney managed to 
pull Lt. House's feet from in front of the door and Butler was 
able to close it with the handle of a mop (Tr. 12-7, p. 100). 
Once the door was closed no more rounds entered the Bates house. 
McKinney administered first aid to Lt. House, but he did not 
respond (Tr. 12-7, pp. 101-102). 
After the shooting stopped, Defendant, who was wounded 
and had retreated into the Singer house, was observed approaching 
the Bates house unarmed (Tr. 12-7, pp. 241-242). Agents ordered 
him to lie on the ground where he was given medical attention 
(Tr. 12-7, pp. 264-270, 171-172). At about the same time, 
armored personnel carriers (APCs) entered the property. One 
blocked the northwest window of the Singer house from which shots 
were fired (Tr. 12-7, pp. 68-69). The other was used to evacuate 
the injured Fred House (Tr. 12-6, p. 24), after which the APC 
returned and was used to evacuate Defendant to a nearby ambulance 
(Tr. 12-7, 172-173). Shortly afterwards, F.B.I, agents received 
a telephone call from Jonathan Swapp, who had hooked up the phone 
again. Jonathan indicated that the family was willing to 
surrender (Tr. 12-5, pp. 124-126). Thereafter, Jonathan Swapp, 
John Timothy Singer and the other members of the Singer family 
left the house and surrendered themselves to federal custody. 
Lt. Fred House was pronounced dead on arrival at the 
University of Utah Medical Center on January 28, 1988 (Tr. 12-8, 
p. 145). The State Medical Examiner, Dr. Edwin Sweeney, 
testified that Lt. House died as a result of a single gunshot 
wound to his chest (Tr. 12-8, p. 153). The projectile entered 
Lt. House's chest directly below the right nipple and travelled 
backward and downward from right to left (Tr. 12-8, p. 151). The 
projectile nicked the aorta, which caused the death (Tr. 12-8, p. 
152). 
Ten expended .30 caliber bullets were recovered after 
the shooting (Exhibits B-l through B-9, and B-37). Seven were 
fired from John Timothy Singer's Plainfield carbine (Tr. 12-13, 
p. 273), which was located on a table in John Timothy Singer's 
bedroom at the north end annex of the Singer house (Tr. 12-13, 
pp. 157-159). That Plainfield .30 caliber carbine had been 
purchased from a gun shop in West Valley City by John Timothy 
Singer in January of 1988 (Tr. 12-9, pp. 98-103). 
Of the seven rounds fired from John Timothy Singer's 
rifle, one was recovered from the floor of the Bates house in the 
same location where HRT members had removed Lt. House's clothing 
and administered first aid (Tr. 12-7, p. 289). A substance found 
on that projectile tested positive for type 0 human blood, 
consistent with the blood found on the shirt of the victim (Tr. 
12-8, pp. 58-61). Another round was found in the jacket of FBI 
Agent Don Roberts, who was in the Jepsen home when the shooting 
started and was hit by a round, but not injured because he was 
wearing a bullet-proof vest (Tr. 12-8, p. 17-32). Four other 
rounds were recovered from inside the Bates house (Tr. 12-7, pp. 
282-290; Tr. 12-8, pp. 73-74). A seventh round was taken from a 
vehicle parked in the driveway of the Jepsen house during the 
shooting (Tr. 12-8, pp. 12-13). 
After being taken into custody, John Timothy Singer was 
given a Miranda warning, waived his rights, and gave a statement 
to officers wherein he admitted that he was seated in his 
wheelchair in his bedroom looking out his window in the Singer 
home when Addam and Jonathan went out to milk the goat on January 
28, 1988. He said that when he saw dogs running from the Bates 
house he grabbed his rifle and fired at the dogs. He denied 
firing at any people (Tr. 12-9, pp. 55-81; Exhibit E-7). 
Two .30 caliber rounds fired from Jonathan Swapp's 
Alpine carbine were recovered from the Jepsen garage (Tr. 12-7, 
p. 296; Tr. 12-8, p. 7; Tr. 12-13, p. 265). A third round was 
recovered from a first floor ceiling joist in the Bates house 
(Tr. 12-8, pp. 186-189). Two expended .30 caliber casings which 
had been ejected from the Alpine carbine were found on the ground 
in the snow at the northeast corner of the Singer house in the 
area where Agent Metcalf had seen Jonathan Swapp kneel and point 
his rifle (Tr. 12-8, pp. 183). Firearms identification and 
trajectory analysis evidence revealed that the rounds fired from 
the Alpine rifle at the northeast corner of the Singer house went 
through the doorway of the Bates house, passed through the narrow 
corridor where the agents were scrambling for cover, exited 
through a rear window, and ultimately lodged where they were 
found in the garage of the Jepsen house (Tr. 12-13, pp. 256-257). 
After the occupants surrendered, search warrants were 
executed on the Singer property and structures, including the 
Singer house. The agents searching that house discovered a 
virtual arsenal in that dwelling (Exhibit D-6.2). Firearms and 
ammunition were found in positions close to windows and makeshift 
gun ports. A total of twenty-three handguns, shotguns and 
rifles, including the Plainfield .30 caliber carbine and the 
Alpine .30 cal. carbine from which the rounds were earlier fired 
were recovered from the residence and property (Tr. 12-13, pp. 
132-187). Eight thousand three hundred and four (8,304) rounds 
of ammunition were found stacked in places within the residence 
where they could be easily reached for reloading (Tr, 12-13, p. 
186; Tr. 12-14, p. 261). Of the twenty-three firearms 
recovered, twenty-one were fully functional, seventeen were 
loaded when seized, and sixteen had no safety or had the safeties 
off (Tr. 12-13, pp. 132-187). Defendant Swapp's .30-06 was found 
where he had fallen. It was loaded, with one round chambered and 
seven rounds in the clip. The safety was off (Tr. 12-13, pp. 
172-173) . 
After Lt. House was killed and Defendant was recovering 
from his injuries, he called and spoke with a news reporter, Rodd 
Wagner of the Salt Lake Tribune. In response to Wagner's 
question why Fred House had to die, Addam Swapp responded, "Well, 
hey, listen. Listen to me. You read the letter that I sent to 
the governor. You read it carefully, the last p.s., and that's 
what happened." Wagner said "You're saying that the warning was 
given?" and Defendant responded, "Yes." (Tr. 12-14, p. 38) 
During the trial, Defendant testified, admitted to the 
bombing of the Stake Center and conceded that he anticipated a 
confrontation with local law enforcement as a result (Tr. 12-14, 
pp. 152, 204, 234). He admitted that he had sawed off a couple 
of shotguns in anticipation of a confrontation with law 
enforcement, and that he considered twenty firearms on the 
property to be his guns (Tr. 12-14, pp. 222-223). He also 
admitted that during the 13 days he had fired approximately 100 
shots in the directions of the lights and speakers (Tr. 12-14, 
pp. 172-175/ 225), and that he knew officers were erecting the 
lights when he fired in their direction (Tr. 12-14, pp. 218-219). 
He admitted that he had written the letter to the Governor, 
including the warning not to enter the boundary line of the 
property, and that he considered the Bates house to be part of 
the Singer property (Tr. 12-14, pp. 236-237). Although he denied 
shouldering his weapon during the shootout (Tr. 12-14, p. 189), 
he admitted that when he went out to milk the goat on January 28, 
1988, he was armed with a fully loaded rifle, 2 loaded six guns, 
and extra ammunition (Tr. 12-14, p. 258, 269). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Defendant was not entitled to a bill of particulars 
in this case. The State provided him with a 12-page affidavit of 
probable cause filed in connection with the Information. 
Further, the State provided him with three (3) memoranda of legal 
theories which also contained factual allegations and tied them 
to the State's theory of accomplice or "party" liability. The 
State presented essentially the same evidence as had been 
presented in Defendant's federal trial, and there was no claim on 
his part that he was surprised by any of the evidence presented 
in the State's case. Further, he has failed to allege how his 
failure to obtain a bill of particulars affected his ability to 
prepare an adequate defense or how it in any way deprived him of 
the opportunity to assert a defense he reasonably might have had 
against the charge. In any event, any error here asserted would 
be harmless error under Rule 30 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. 
2. The trial court correctly interpreted Utah Code 
Ann. §76-3-401, which limits aggregate minimum sentences which 
may be imposed to 12 years, to be inapplicable where the prior 
sentence involved a federal determinate sentence• The trial 
court's interpretation was consistent with precedent from other 
jurisdictions, as well as with the Utah State Legislature's 
subsequent amendment of the statute which made clear that the 
section limits only the effect of consecutive sentences and not 
the court's authority to impose such. The trial court limited 
the Defendant's aggregate maximum sentence under the statute to 
30 years, giving effect to the reasonable limitation of sentences 
provided by the statute without giving the Defendant a windfall 
to which he was not entitled. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR BILL 
OF PARTICULARS WHERE HE WAS SUFFICIENTLY ON NOTICE OF 
THE CHARGE AGAINST HIM, 
Rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
provides in pertinent part as follows: 
When facts not set out in an information 
or indictment are required to inform a 
defendant of the nature and cause of the 
offense charged, so as to enable him to 
prepare his defense, the defendant may file a 
written motion for a bill of particulars. . . 
The request for and contents of a bill of 
particulars shall be limited to a statement 
of factual information needed to set forth 
the essential elements of the particular 
offense charged. 
If an information does not adequately notify an accused 
of what he is charged with, he has a right to a bill of 
particulars, and he is entitled to whatever information the 
prosecutor has that may be useful in helping to fix the date, 
time, and place, of the alleged offense. A bill of particulars, 
however, is not a device to enable the defendant to obtain a 
preview of the prosecution's evidence. State v. Robbins/ 709 
P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985). 
Similarly, there is no requirement in a bill of 
particulars that the defendant be told what evidence will be 
presented to prove the charge against him, and if the charging 
document is sufficiently clear as to what the crime is, the 
defendant is not entitled to a bill of particulars at all. State 
v. Moraine, 475 P.2d 831, 833 (Utah 1970). 
The central notion is that a defendant is entitled to 
sufficient information to enable him to adequately prepare a 
defense. In State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100 (Utah 1988), the Utah 
Supreme Court reversed a conviction for Racketeering by means of 
drug trafficking where the defendant was charged by indictment 
under the vague general language of the racketeering (or RICE) 
statute and was not afforded a sufficient bill of particulars 
upon demand. The Court there stated: 
Although an information may be accompanied by 
a fact statement detailing the prosecution's 
contentions in support of the charges, an 
information or indictment is legally 
sufficient even if it consists of nothing 
more than an extremely summary statement of 
the charge that would not provide the accused 
with sufficient particulars to prepare an 
adequate defense. When an indictment or 
information legally sufficient under rule 
4(b) does not provide the notice guaranteed 
by article I, section 12, the accused may 
request a bill of particulars under rule 
4 ( e ) . . . . 
Id. at 104 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted). 
The Court in Bell went on to point out that the 
indictment in that case "merely repeated verbatim the broad, 
vague language of the RICE statute without describing any facts 
or circumstances constituting the crime charged other than a 
statement that the crime had been committed during a ten-month 
period." Id. at 104. The peculiar complexities of the RICE 
statute required that the State provide clarification (i.e. what 
constituted the alleged "enterprise"?) in order to adequately 
inform the defendant of the charges so that he could prepare his 
defense. Id., at 103. 
By contrast, the Information in the case before the 
Court was accompanied by an extensive 12-page affidavit setting 
out factual allegations in support of the charges. (R. 2-6) (See 
Addendum A, "Information" and " Affidavit of Probable Cause for 
Information.") 
Although not required by the statute, the State in its 
response to Defendant's Motion for Bill of Particulars also 
provided Defendant with a memorandum of authority concerning its 
legal theories, which also contained factual allegations (R. 249-
252, 438-446). (See Addendum B, "State's Response to Defendant 
Addam Swapp's Motion for Bill of Particulars" and Addendum C, 
"Memorandum of Authority Re: Principles of Accomplice Liability 
and of Legal Causation.") 
Those legal theories are consistent with the position 
taken by the State throughout the proceedings that the Defendant 
was criminally responsible as the leader of the group engaged in 
a 13-day armed resistance to lawful authority which culminated in 
the death of Lt. Fred House as he and his co-defendants jointly 
resisted officers by the use of deadly weapons. Although 
characterized in Defendant's brief as conceptually complex, it is 
not. 
Defendant was well aware from the Affidavit of Probable 
Cause and from other memoranda filed by the State (alluded to 
below) that the State never asserted that he personally fired the 
fatal shot, and that the State's theory was always that he was 
responsible as an accomplice or party to the offense under §76-2-
202. 
Defendant points out that he was charged under three 
subsections of second degree murder, and asserts that this 
somehow confused him and made him unable to adequately prepare 
his defense without a bill of particulars. He does not allege 
how his preparation would have differed depending on which theory 
he was defending. Moreover, it is clear that the State was not 
required to elect a theory, State v. Butler, 560 P.2d 1136, 1138 
(Utah 1977), and that the three statutory theories alleged 
comprise but one offense of second degree murder. State v. 
Russell, 733 P.2d 162, 167 (Utah 1987). 
In Russell, the defendant was charged with second 
degree murder under the same three theories alleged in the 
instant case, and the Utah Supreme Court rejected his claim that 
he was entitled to a jury instruction requiring a unanimous 
verdict on any one of the theories. The Court held that although 
second degree murder may be committed in different manners and 
with different mens rea, it is but one offense. Ld. at 167. 
Defendant's assertion that the closest he came to 
learning the prosecution's theory of the case came during closing 
arguments is disingenuous. The closing argument was a 
recapitulation of the opening statement and of the memoranda and 
arguments submitted at the time of the hearing on Defendant's 
Motion for Bill of Particulars. The prosecution maintained a 
consistent posture throughout the proceedings. 
During opening statement, the prosecutor discussed 
accomplice liability (Tr. 12-2, p. 35), and stated the following: 
Ladies and gentlemen, the State believes 
that the evidence will show that although the 
fatal shot was fired by Timothy Singer, he 
didn't act alone. These defendants stood 
together in armed resistance of lawful 
authority for 13 days by the use of firearms. 
They had those full 13 days to reconsider 
what they were doing and to prevent 
bloodshed. The evidence will show that Addam 
Swapp was the leader of the armed resistance 
and it was he who set in motion the events 
which ended with the death of Officer House. 
He not only intended this violent 
confrontation but he insisted upon it, and he 
more than anyone else could have prevented 
what happened that day. He set in motion 
events, the probable and natural consequences 
of which was the death of the officer. 
(Tr. 12-2, pp. 33-34) 
That same theory was clearly set out in several of the 
State's memoranda filed prior to the hearing on Defendant's 
Motion for Bill of Particulars, all of which were alluded to by 
the prosecutor at the hearing. (Tr. 11-16, pp. 79) 
Specifically, those memos include the following: 
1) "Memorandum of Authority Re: Principles of 
Accomplice Liability and of Legal Causation" (R. 438-446); 
2) "State's Memorandum Re: Admissibility of Evidence of 
Other Crimes and Conduct of Addcim Swapp Under Rule 404(b), U.R.E. 
(Sheriff Eley incident)" (R. 450-462); and 
3) "State's Memorandum Re: Admissibility of Evidence of 
Other Crimes and Conduct Under Rule 404(b), U.R.E." (R. 463-471). 
For example, in evaluating Defendant's claim that the 
closest he ever came to learning the prosecution's theory came at 
closing, consider the following language from the "State's 
Memorandum Re: Admissibility of Evidence of Other Crimes and 
Conduct of Addam Swapp Under Rule 404(b), U.R.E. (Sheriff Eley 
incident)": 
The State contends that Addam Swapp set 
in motion events the natural and probable 
outcome of which was death. He set the stage 
for a foreseeably tragic outcome. His own 
conduct, separate and distinct from that of 
John Timothy Singer (whom he encouraged in 
armed resistance), exhibited a conscious 
disregard for life. He acted with depraved 
indifference to human life and engaged in 
conduct which created a grave risk of death 
to another. That conduct culminated on 
January 28, 1988, with the death of Lt. Fred 
House, but it did not begin there. His 
threats to the Summit County officers in 
October indicated his intent to forcibly 
resist any law enforcement officers who might 
attempt to come onto the property to question 
or arrest him. When placed in context with 
his subsequent bombing of the church and his 
announcement to the world that he was 
responsible for it, (i.e. placing pole with 
inscription at scene and speaking with news 
reporter day of bombing), together with his 
steadfast armed resistance and his complete 
refusal to negotiate a peaceful settlement to 
the stand-off, it is clear that Addam Swapp 
not only intended a bloody confrontation, but 
absolutely insisted upon it. 
(R. 459.) 
This is not a case where the defense was surprised by 
evidence presented at trial. As the Defendant himself has 
pointed out, just prior to this case he was previously convicted 
of several federal crimes, some of which arose from the same 
criminal episode out of which the State homicide charge arose. 
He was therefore particularly familiar with the factual basis of 
the charges against him, and in a uniquely knowledgeable position 
to prepare an adequate defense to the charge. At no time during 
the homicide prosecution did he assert that evidence presented by 
the State caught him by surprise or unprepared. 
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that under the 
circumstances the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Defendant's Motion for Bill of Particulars, and that the 
Court should affirm the trial court's ruling. State v. Riddle, 
112 Utah 356, 188 P.2d 449 (1948). 
Further, Defendant has failed to allege how the trial 
court's denial of his Motion for Bill of Particulars could have 
prejudiced his case. To establish prejudicial error justifying 
reversal on appeal, Defendant must show that the denial of his 
motion "deprived him of the opportunity to assert a defense he 
reasonably might have had against the charges." State v. 
Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985). Defendant has not 
alluded to any defense which he might have raised had more detail 
been provided through a bill of particulars, assuming it were 
even possible for the State to provide more detail than had 
already been provided when the bill was sought. 
Finally, under Rule 30 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, any erroneous denial of a motion for bill of 
particulars would only require reversal where, absent the error, 
there was a reasonable likelihood of a result more favorable to 
the accused, thereby undermining the Court's confidence in the 
outcome of the trial. The Defendant has not made a plausible 
argument that his defense was impaired, nor has he alleged how a 
bill of particulars would have assisted him in asserting any 
available defense or would have likely affected the outcome of 
the trial in any way. 
In the event the Court finds that Defendant has made a 
plausible argument that his defense was impaired by a failure to 
provide a bill of particulars, the record in this case 
demonstrates that any such error did not affect his substantial 
rights in this case and should be deemed harmless under Rule 30 
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S CONSECUTIVE SENTENCE WAS PROPER UNDER UTAH LAW 
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in 
sentencing him to a term consecutive to that imposed upon him in 
his federal trial. As authority he cites Utah Code Ann. §76-3-
401 (1978)(amended 1989), which at the time he was sentenced read 
in pertinent part as follows: 
(4) If a court lawfully determined to 
impose consecutive sentences, the aggregate 
minimum of all sentences imposed may not 
exceed twelve years' imprisonment and the 
aggregate maximum of all sentences imposed 
may not exceed thirty years' imprisonment. . 
(5) The limitation in subsection (4) 
applies: 
• • • 
(c) If a defendant has already been 
sentenced by a court of this state 
other than the present sentencing court 
or by a court of another state or 
federal jurisdiction. 
At sentencing the question arose as to whether the 
minimum aggregate limitation in the statute would operate to bar 
the imposition of consecutive sentences in this case, since Addam 
Swapp had already been sentenced to a determinate term of more 
than 12 years in connection with his federal convictions. 
The parties researched and briefed the issue, after 
which the trial court ruled that the prohibition of aggregate 
minimum sentences exceeding 12 years was inapplicable where the 
sentence of the first sentencing court is a determinate sentence, 
citing People v. Dye, 69 111.2d 298, 371 N.E.2d 630, 633-34 
(1977). (R. 1367-1370) (See Addendum D, Judge Murphy's "Summary 
Decision.") 
In Dye, the defendant had been convicted of a federal 
offense and sentenced to a determinate term of 5 years. He was 
thereafter convicted in state court of forgery, which carried an 
indeterminate term of from 1 to 10 years. The trial court 
ordered the defendant's state sentence to run consecutively to 
his previously imposed federal 5-year term, and he appealed. 
The Illinois statute pertaining to consecutive 
sentencing [which referred to both state and federal sentences in 
§1005-8-4(a)] limited the aggregate minimum period of consecutive 
sentences to "twice the lowest minimum term authorized under 
Section 5-8-1 for the most serious felony involved." 
111.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 38, §1005-8-4(c). 
The Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District, held 
that the Federal determinate sentence previously imposed had to 
be considered to be both the minimum and the maximum terms under 
the Illinois statute. The Court further found that the more 
serious felony was the state forgery offense (1-10 years as 
opposed to 5 years for the federal offense), that the aggregate 
minimum could therefore be no greater than 2 years, and that 
since the federal determinate term was for 5 years, consecutive 
sentences could not be imposed. People v. Dye, 45 Ill.App.3d 
465, 359 N.E.2d 1187, 1189 (Ill.App.4 Dist. 1977). 
The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed in People v. 
Dye, 371 N.E.2d 630 (1977), stating: 
Because by their very nature, Federal 
determinate sentences have no maximum or 
minimum, the appellate court considered the 
5-year sentence actually imposed against the 
defendant as the minimum period for that 
sentence . 
In our opinion, the appellate court 
erred in determining that the sentencing 
provision in issue applied to Federal 
determinative sentences. The section clearly 
confines its application to situations where 
the aggregate minimum terms of imprisonment 
can be calculated. Federal determinate 
sentences do not have minimum or maximum 
terms. 
371 N.E.2d at 633-634. 
The Court also pointed out policy reasons against 
interpreting federal sentences as "minimum sentences" in limiting 
consecutive sentences: 
Also, if this provision were held to 
apply to Federal determinative sentences, and 
the Illinois offense were the most serious, 
judges would be precluded from imposing 
consecutive sentences . . . in situations 
where the determinative sentence was greater 
than 2 years and the Illinois offense is less 
than a Class 1 felony. . . . 
Id. at 634. 
Similarly under Utah law, if §76-3-401(4) were to be 
interpreted to include federal determinate sentences as "minimum" 
sentences, any offender who had been previously sentenced to a 
determinate term of over 11 years in the federal system would be 
immune from imposition of a consecutive Utah sentence for a 
second degree felony term (1-15 years) notwithstanding the fact 
that such an offender might have been sentenced in federal court 
to less than half of the 30-year maximum limitation proscribed, 
and notwithstanding the fact that in-state offenders could be 
sentenced to two consecutive second degree felony terms. Such an 
interpretation would constitute an unnecessary windfall to the 
federally-convicted defendant and would not serve the end of 
preventing "arbitrary or oppressive treatment of 
persons. ..convicted of offenses," according to the purposes and 
principles of statutory construction delineated in Utah Code Ann. 
§76-1-104 (1990). 
The purpose for statutory limitation on consecutive 
sentences, as indicated in the Commentary to the Model Penal 
Code, is to guard against oppressive sentences. ("The occasional 
abuse that results in sentences built up to the level of 100 
years or more illustrates the problem." M.P.C. and Commentaries, 
1985 ed. § 7.06, p. 272.) No oppression to a defendant results 
by considering federal determinate sentences only in determining 
the aggregate maximum allowable under §76-3-401(4), particularly 
where such sentences by definition have no minimum term which can 
be computed under the statute. 
At the time that §76-3-401 was enacted in 1973, the 
only significant minimum term imposed under Utah's general 
classification of felonies was that imposed for a first degree 
felony (5 year minimum term, life top). In determining what 
level of consecutive sentencing the legislature may have intended 
to limit under §76-3-401(4), note that consecutive sentencing for 
two first degree felonies (5 to life) and two second degree 
felonies (1 to 15) would still be within the acceptable minimum 
term of 12 years. 
In Utah, the legislature determines the degree of 
felony for a given offense which, upon conviction, carries a 
minimum and maximum term. Such terms are generally separated by 
several years. (14 year period between minimum and maximum term 
for a second degree felony, for example.) Once a defendant is 
convicted of a felony offense and committed to the Utah State 
Prison, the Board of Pardons has broad discretion within the 
minimum and maximum terms to determine the actual time an inmate 
serves at the prison, Utah Code Ann. §77-27-5 (Supp. 1990). [In 
fact, the power and authority of the Board of Pardons is so broad 
that it may, under its statutory and constitutional authority to 
commute sentences, go below the minimum term imposed under the 
state's indeterminate sentencing scheme. §77-27-5(1)(a) (1990); 
Utah Const, art. VII, § 12.] 
In the federal system, by contrast, it is the judge and 
not the parole authority who determines the amount of time a 
convicted defendant serves in prison. The judge does not 
therefore impose any indeterminate minimum and maximum sentence. 
Looking for a "minimum" sentencing term within such a system and 
attempting to correlate it to Utah's indeterminate sentencing 
scheme cannot meaningfully be done. People v. Dye, 371 N.E.2d 
630, 633-634 (111. 1977). 
The rationale in Dye that federal determinate sentences 
are inapplicable in computing aggregate minimum terms has been 
applied as well to determinate sentences imposed by another 
state, People v. Presley, 385 N.E.2d 181 (Ill.App.4 Dist. 1979), 
as well as to determinate sentences imposed within the sentencing 
state itself. People v. Peebles, 465 N.E.2d 539 (Ill.App.l Dist. 
1984). The same principle applies - where a sentence is 
determinate, no minimum term can be calculated. 
In the instant case, the trial court determined that 
the language of §76-3-401 concerning limitations on aggregate 
minimums and aggregate maximums does not limit the court's 
discretion in imposing consecutive sentences but merely dictates 
the effect of such sentences. (R. 1367-1370) (See Addendum D, 
Judge Murphy's "Summary Decision.") The court did provide, 
pursuant to §76-3-401(4) that although Defendant's sentence was 
to be served consecutively to his federal term, the aggregate 
maximum term of both sentences could in no event exceed 30 years. 
(R. 1422-1425) (See Addendum E, "Judgment Sentence, and 
Commitment") 
Further supporting the trial court's interpretation is 
the fact that during the 1989 General Session, the Utah State 
Legislature amended §76-3-401 to clarify its legislative intent. 
Among other changes, the Legislature added a new subsection 76-3-
401(8) which provides as follows: 
(8) This section may not be construed 
to restrict the number or length of 
individual consecutive sentences that may be 
imposed or to affect the validity of any 
sentence so imposed, but only to limit the 
length of sentences actually served under the 
commitments. 
"When a statute is amended, the amendment is persuasive 
evidence of the legislature's intent when it passed the former, 
unamended statute." State v Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 486 (Utah 
1988). (Parenthetically, the Legislature also deleted from 
subsection 76-3-401(4) the minimum aggregate limitation of 12 
years, but retained the maximum aggregate limitation of 30 
years.) 
The trial court in this case did not err in not 
calculating the federal determinate term of the defendant as a 
"minimum" term within the meaning of §76-3-401. The trial 
court's interpretation of the statute was sound, as it gave 
effect to the reasonable limitation of sentences provided by the 
statute without giving the Defendant a windfall to which he was 
not entitled. The sentence in this case should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly denied Defendant's Motion For 
Bill of Particulars where he was sufficiently notified of the 
charge against him and was able to prepare an adequate defense. 
The trial court also imposed a lawful consecutive sentence in 
this case. Both the conviction and sentence should be affirmed 
by the Court. 
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SUMMIT COUNTY, COALVILLE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ADDAM W. SWAPP, 
DOB: 4/6/61 
JONATHAN RAMON SWAPP, 
DOB: 5/6/67 
JOHN TIMOTHY SINGER, 
DOB: 9/3/66 
Defendants. 
* Bail $ / /• , «'j>A / /-
i Judge Maurice D. Jones 
t INFORMATION 
Case Number 
The undersigned, Ronald E. Miller, Criminal 
Investigator for the Utah Attorney General's Office, upon oath, 
states on information and belief that the defendants, ADDAM W. 
SWAPP, JONATHAN SWAPP, and JOHN TIMOTHY SINGER, committed the 
following crimes; 
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE, a First 
Degree Felony, in Summit County, Utah, on or about January 28, 
1988, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 203 (a),(b), 
•nd/or (c), and Title 76, Chapter 2, Section 202, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that the defendants, ADDAM W. 
SWAPP, JOANATHAN R. SWAPP, and JOHN TIMOTHY SINGER, as parties to 
the offense, intentionally or knowingly caused the death of Fred 
House; and/or intending to cause serious bodily injury to 
another, said defendants committed an act clearly dangerous to 
human life that caused the death of Fred House; and/or acting 
under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human 
life, said defendants knowingly engaged in conduct which created 
a grave risk of death to another and thereby caused the death of 
Fred House. 
DATED this i_ day of V 1988 
tona E. Miller, Affiant 
Subscribed and sworn Xo before^ro^ 
this V day. of 1 A / /, 
1988.
 y \ -\y/ / 
HONORABLE MAURICE TFT'JONES 
Third Circuit Court Judge 
This Information is based upon evidence from the 
following witnessest 
1. Robert Bryant 
2. David Johnson 
3. Jerry Pope 
4. Robert Berry 
5. Joe Offret 
6. John Butler 
7. Martin Brown 
8. Dave Edward 
9. Steve Wiley 
10. Rick Intellini 
11. Hugh McKinney 
12. Catherine Baker 
13. Robert Brinkman 
14. Kent Wilde 
15. Ron Baxter 
16. Richard Crum 
17. Hal Metcalfe 
18. Dr. E.S. Sweeney 
19. Robert Baldwin 
20. Donald Roberts 
21. Donald Jepsen 
22. Miriam Jepsen 
23. Phillip Mitchell 
24. Larry Meadows 
25. Charles D. Shepherd 
26. Felix Garcia 
27. Ryan Nell 
28. Dave Nell 
29. Cal Clegg 
30. Chad Gibbs 
31. Tommy Whitman 
32. Scott Barker 
33. Hike Kelly 
34. Jim Evans 
, „ ~~ day 
of SCffci+vOuL^- 1988. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
STEPHEN J. SORENSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
Chief, Litigation Division 
By: CREIGHTON C. HORTON II 
Assistant Attorney General 
REQUEST THAT DEFENDANTS BE HELD WITHOUT BAIL: 
Defendants have all been convicted of federal felony offenses in 
Federal District Court and have all been sentenced by Judge Bruce 
Jenkins to minimum mandatory prison terms on September 2, 1988. 
The State will acquire temporary jurisdiction over the defendants 
through writs of habeus corpus ad prosecuendum to try them on the 
instant charges# after which all defendants will be returned to 
the custody of federal officials to begin serving their prison 
sentences. Hence# the State requests that the defendants listed 
above be held during the pendency of the instant case without 
bail. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON - 3472 
Attorney General 
STEPHEN J. SORENSON - 3049 
Assistant Attorney General 
Chief, Litigation Division 
CREIGHTON C. HORTON II - 1542 
Assistant Attorney General 
DAVID J. SCHVENDIMAN - 2889 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for State of Utah 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1016 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SUMMIT COUNTY, COALVILLE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
-vs-
ADDAM W. SWAPP, 
DOB: 4/6/61 
JONATHAN RAMON SWAPP, 
DOB: 5/6/67 
JOHN TIMOTHY SINGER, 
DOB: 9/3/66 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF PROBABLE 
CAUSE FOR INFORMATION 
Case No. 
) 
I SB 
) 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SUMMIT 
I, Ronald E. Miller, being first duly sworn upon oath, 
depose and state as followsi 
1. I am a criminal investigator for the Utah Attorney 
General's Office. 
2. In connection with this investigation, I have 
interviewed witnesses, reviewed witness statements, collected and 
examined physical evidence obtained by search warrant, and 
reviewed official Federal Bureau of Investigation Crime 
Laboratory and Utah State Crime Laboratory reports. I believe 
these sources of information to be trustworthy, and the 
information gathered to be true and correct. 
3. On January 16, 1988 Defendant Addam Swapp and 
others planted and detonated an explosive device in an LDS Church 
chapel in Marion, Utah. Federal authorities subsequently 
indicted Defendant Addam Swapp for the bombing, and Defendant 
Addam Swapp's mother-in-law, Vickie Singer, for aiding and 
abetting. After the bombing, Defendant Addam Swapp, his brother 
Defendant Jonathan Swapp, and Vickie Singer barricaded themselves 
on the Singer family property, and refused to surrender to law 
enforcement authorities. Also barricaded on the property were 
Defendant John Timothy Singer, Defendant Addam Swapp's two wives, 
Heidi Singer Swapp and Charlotte Singer Swapp, their six juvenile 
children, and Vickie Singer's three juvenile sons, totaling 
fifteen people. The Singer/Swapp families remained barricaded on 
the property for thirteen days before surrendering. 
* 
4. The Singer family property is approximately 2.33 
acres with four residences and a number of outbuildings. The 
defendants and family members were barricaded in the main 
residence. Approximately 215 feet west of the main residence was 
a house known as the Bates house; approximately 187 feet west of 
the Bates house was a second residence known as the Jepsen house. 
The Bates house was vacant during the thirteen day siege, and the 
Jepsen house was used as an observation post by law enforcement 
authorities. 
5. The United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 
Firearms (ATF), the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Utah 
State, and Summit County law enforcement authorities cooperated 
in resolving the siege. Special Agent in Charge (SAC) Robert 
Bryant and Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) David Johnson were in 
charge of FBI personnel. SAC Bryant requested the help of 
Lieutenant Fred House and his dog "Mike" from the Utah State 
Department of Corrections to assist in a plan to arrest 
Defendants Addam and Jonathan Swapp. Lt. Fred House was a 
certified Utah State Peace Officer. 
6. Between January 16, 1988 when the siege started 
until January 28, 1986 when it ended, FBI and other law 
enforcement personnel maintained twenty-four hour surveillance on 
the Singer property and occupants. On frequent occasions, 
surveillance personnel observed Defendant Addam Swapp armed with 
pistols, a knife, and a rifle, and Defendant Jonathan Swapp armed 
with a pistol and a rifle. Both defendants moved about the 
property while armed. Repeated requests for surrender were 
ignored. 
7. On January 20, 1988, Special Agent in Charge Nolan 
Douglas of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms wrote a 
letter advising Defendant Addam Swapp and Vickie Singer that 
warrants for their arrest and search warrants for the property 
had been issued in connection with the bombing of the LDS church 
building in Marion. Douglas advised that they should surrender 
immediately and end the standoff. 
8. On January 26, 1988, a letter from Governor Norman 
Bangerter was delivered to Defendant Addam Swapp and Vickie 
Singer, wherein the Governor entreated them to surrender. The 
following day both wrote reply letters to the Governor• 
Defendant Addam Swapp indicated in his letter that he would not 
surrender and declared the Singer property an independent 
sovereign nation. He further warned the Governor that any man 
who attempted to cross the Singer property boundary would be 
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treated as an aggressor# and that they would defend themselves in 
any manner they saw fit. 
9. Based on surveillance observations, SAC Bryant and 
SSA Johnson devised a tactical plan to capture Defendants Addam 
Swapp and Jonathan Swapp with the assistance of Lt. Fred House 
and his dog. The plan was for a team consisting of FBI agents 
and Lt. Fred House with his dog to infiltrate the Bates house on 
the Singer property. Loudspeakers would be set up on the north 
perimeter of the property near the Bates house, and when 
Defendants Addam and Jonathan Swapp attempted to disable the 
speakers, a canine handler would send his dog to incapacitate 
them until FBI agents could control them. Lt. House and the FBI 
team in the Bates house would cut off the defendants' retreat, or 
arrest them if they entered the Bates house. 
10. In the late night hours of January 27, 1988 
Officer Fred House with his dog "Mike", and an FBI team entered 
the Bates house through a west living room window out of view 
from the main Singer residence. The FBI team consisted of 
Special Agents John Butler, Martin Brown, Rick Intellini, Dave 
Edward, Steve Wiley, and Hugh McKinney. In the early morning 
hours of January 28, 1988 the plan was put into effect, but 
failed when the dog sent to incapacitate Defendants Addam and 
Jonathan Swapp became confused and returned to its master. Both 
Swapps returned to the main residence without going into the 
Bates house. 
11. After the failure of the initial plan, SAC Bryant 
and SSA Johnson decided on a fall-back plan based on prior 
observations of Defendants Addam and Jonathan Swapp. The 
surveillance had noted that every morning the two men milked a 
goat in a shed approximately midway between the main Singer 
residence and the Bates house. The FBI team would stay in the 
Bates house, and when Defendants Addam and Jonathan Swapp came 
out to milk the goat# two dogs would be sent to incapacitate 
them. Officer Jerry Pope, also a Department of Corrections 
Canine Handler, and his dog "Pacson" were sent to the Bates house 
to assist Lt. Fred House. 
12. At approximately 8:19AM, January 28, 1988 
Defendant Addam Swapp and Defendant Jonathan Swapp walked to the 
goat shed from the main residence. Both carried rifles with 
shoulder straps slung over their shoulders. SAC Bryant and SSA 
Johnson gave permission to the team in the Bates house to carry 
out the arrest plan. 
13. Lt. Fred House moved to the entry way near the 
front door of the Bates house with his dog, and Officer Jerry 
Pope was behind and to one side with his dog. SA Butler stood 
behind Officer Pope, and SA Brown stood behind Lt. Fred House. 
Special Agents Wiley, Intellini, Edward, and McKinney were on the 
second floor. SA Intellini sighted his assault rifle through a 
stairway landing window. At approximately 8:28AM Lt. House 
opened the front door, and he and Officer Pope keyed their dogs 
on Defendants Addam Swapp and Jonathan Swapp who were walking 
from the goat shed to the main residence. 
14. As the dogs left the doorway, gunfire erupted and 
bullets started hitting the front door and entry way of the Bates 
house. Special Agents Butler and Intellini observed Defendant 
Addam Swapp turn, unsling his rifle, and aim it in their 
direction. Butler and Intellini fired their weapons almost 
simultaneously, one shot each, and Defendant Addam Swapp was hit 
and knocked to the ground. SA Brown heard Lt. House groan, and 
saw him fall back in the hallway closet. The dogs reentered the 
Bates house, and SA Butler then managed to close the front door 
with a broom handle. The incoming gunfire stopped when SA Butler 
closed the door. SA's Butler and Brown dragged Lt. House to the 
kitchen, lifted his body armor, and discovered a wound in his 
aide. Lt. House was unconscious. 
15. When the gunfire erupted, SA Hal Metcalfe was 
watching Defendants Addam and Jonathan Swapp through binoculars 
from his position in the Jepsen house. After moving his 
binoculars momentarily towards the Singer house, he looked back 
and observed Defendant Jonathan Swapp aiming his rifle in 
Metcalfe's direction from a kneeling position near the northeast 
corner of the main residence. SA Metcalfe yelled for everyone in 
the Jepsen house to get down, and immediately after doing so 
bullets struck the house. 
16. The FBI evacuated Lt. House to the University 
Medical Center, Salt Lake City, Utah, where doctors pronounced 
him dead on arrival. An autopsy was performed later that same 
day by Utah State Medical Examiner Dr. Edwin Sweeney. He ruled 
that death was the result of a perforating gunshot wound to the 
chest, and that the manner of death was homicide. 
17. Defendant John Timothy Singer, who is confined to 
a wheelchair, gave a statement to SA's Felix Garcia, ATF, and 
Ronald E. Miller, Utah State Attorney General's Office, wherein 
he admitted that he sat at the west window of his bedroom in the 
main residence watching Defendants Addam and Jonathan Swapp when 
they went to milk the goat; that when Addam and Jonathan 
thereafter walked back toward the main residence, he saw two dogs 
come out the open front doorway of the Bates house; that he 
shouted "dogs", grabbed a .30 caliber semiautomatic carbine from 
his table, and began shooting. Although Defendant J. Timothy 
Singer indicated he knew law enforcement personnel were probably 
in the Bates house, he denied that he intentionally shot at 
anyone, and stated that he only shot at the dogs. Defendant 
Singer also stated that Defendant Addam Swapp had a .30-06 
caliber military Garand, and that Defendant Jonathan Swapp had a 
.30 caliber semiautomatic carbine when they went to milk the 
goat. 
18. Shortly after the gunfire ended, SA Charles 
Shepherd observed Defendant J. Timothy Singer at the west window 
area of his bedroom, and also observed Defendant Jonathan Swapp 
in the same room carrying a rifle. 
19. ATF agents recovered a .30 caliber Plainfield 
carbine without a shoulder sling from the table in Defendant 
Singer's room, and a .30 caliber Alpine military carbine with a 
shoulder sling from the bed in Defendant Singer's room. FBI 
surveillance photographs disclosed that the firearm carried by 
Defendant Jonathan Swapp had a shoulder sling, and that his 
firearm was carried in the slung position before the shooting 
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started. A .30-06 Garand was recovered in the snow near where 
Defendant Addam Swapp was shot. 
20. David Nell and Ryan Nell of Golden Spike Firearms, 
West Valley City, Utah, sold the Plainfield .30 caliber carbine 
to Defendant J. Timothy Singer on January 7, 1988. 
21. Investigators and Utah State Crime Laboratory 
technicians recovered ten fired .30 caliber carbine bullets: 
Five from inside the Bates house, one from the outside wall of 
the Bates house near the front door, two from the Jepsen house 
garage, one from the clothing of an FBI agent who was struck 
after the bullet went through the kitchen wall of the Jepsen 
house, and one from a car parked in the Jepsen driveway. A video 
tape recording of the actual shooting taken by Summit County 
Reserve Sheriff's Deputy James Evans disclosed the sound of 
eleven gunshots on the audio portion of the recording. 
22. SA Richard Crum, FBI Crime Laboratory, assisted by 
surveyors Ron Baxter and Kent Wilde, discovered that the Bates 
house front doorway and the Jepsen house kitchen were within 
Defendant J. Timothy Singer's field of fire from his bedroom 
window. However, SA Crum found that the two bullet holes in the 
Jepsen house garage tracked back through the west window of the 
Bates house, through the length of the Bates house, out the front 
doorway, and to a point near the northeast outside corner of the 
main Singer residence where SA Hal Metcalfe saw Defendant 
Jonathan Swapp aim his rifle. SA Crum tracked the bullet hole in 
the outside wall of the Bates house to the same location. 
23. Based on his firearms analysis, SA Crum further 
discovered that the five .30 caliber carbine bullets recovered 
from inside the Bates house were fired by Defendant J. Timothy 
Singer's Plainfield carbine. The Utah State Crime Laboratory 
determined that one of the five bullets had blood stains that 
were consistent with the blood type of Lt. Fred House. The 
bullets recovered from the Jepsen car and from the clothing of 
the FBI agent who had been struck in the Jepsen house kitchen 
were also fired by Defendant J. Timothy Singer's Plainfield 
carbine. 
24. SA Crum's analysis revealed that the bullet 
recovered from the outside wall of the Bates house, and the two 
bullets recovered from the Jepsen house garage were fired by the 
Alpine carbine. 
25. Investigators recovered 22 empty .30 caliber 
carbine shells from inside Defendant J. Timothy Singer's bedroom, 
including eight from the floor near the window where he said he 
had been firing. Two more were found in the snow near the 
northeast corner of the main residence. SA Crum determined that 
all the empty .30 caliber carbine shells from Defendant Singer's 
bedroom were fired by his Plainfield carbine, and that the two 
shells found near the northeast corner of the residence were 
fired by the Alpine carbine. 
26. Based on the foregoing, there is probable cause to 
believe that Defendants Addam W Swapp, Jonathan R. Swapp, and 
John Timothy Singer, as parties to the offense, intentionally or 
knowingly caused the death of Lt. Fred House; and/or, intending 
to cause serious bodily injury to another, said defendants 
committed an act clearly dangerous to human life which caused the 
death of Lt. Fred House; and/or, acting under circumstances 
evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, the defendants 
knowingly engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death 
to another and thereby caused the death of Lt. Fred House. 
27. Defendants John Timothy Singer, Addam Swapp, and 
Jonathan Swapp were indicted by a Federal Grand Jury, and were 
each convicted of attempted second degree homicide of a Federal 
officer in Federal District Court orr May $^1988. /J 
DATED this 1988. 
RONALD E. MILLER 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORff^ to *>efQj 
this V day of \.' /*e 
1988. 
t^gport Judge 
ADDENDUM B 
DAVID L. WILKINSON - 3472 
Attorney General 
STEPHEN J. SORENSON - 3049 
Assistant Attorney General 
Chief, Litigation Division 
CREIGHTON C. HORTON - 1542 
Assistant Attorney General 
DAVID J. SCHWENDIMAN - 2889 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for State of Utah 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1016 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
: 
STATE OF UTAH 
: STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT 
ADDAM SWAPP'S MOTION FOR 
BILL OF PARTICULARS 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
: Criminal No. 1218 
ADDAM W. SWAPP, 
t Judge Michael R. Murphy 
Defendant. 
The State of Utah, by and through Creighton C. Horton 
II, Assistant Attorney General, and David J. Schwendiman, Special 
Assistant Attorney General, hereby responds to Defendant Addam 
Swapp's Motion For Bill of Particulars as followst 
1. At the time the State filed its criminal 
information in this case, it also filed under seal an extensive 
12-page Affidavit of Probable Cause for the Information. 
Although filed under seal in order to minimize the amount of pre-
trial publicity in this case, it is available to the defendant 
and his counsel, and sets out in considerable detail the facts 
informing the defendant of the nature and cause of the offense 
charged, obviating the need for a bill of particulars under §77-
35-4(e), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
2. The Information specifically charges the defendant, 
as a party to the offense, with the offense of Criminal Homicide, 
Murder in the Second Degree, and contains the statutory 
references to both the substantive crime of murder under §76-5-
203(a), (b), and/or(c), U.C.A., 1953 as amended, as veil as the 
statutory reference to the section dealing with criminal 
responsibility for conduct of another, or -parties" section, §76-
2-202, U.C.A., 1953 as amended. 
3. In Defendant's motion he also asks for the State's 
theories of murder. Although not required under §77-35-4(e) 
pertaining to a motion for bill of particulars, the Defendant has 
been on notice concerning the State's legal theories since before 
the preliminary hearing in this case through the State's filing 
in Third Circuit Court of a document entitled "MEMORANDUM OF 
AUTHORITY RE: PRINCIPLES OF ACCOMPLICE LIABILILTY AND OF LEGAL 
CAUSATION." The State is filing such memorandum again in 
District Court contemporaneously with the filing of this 
response. 
4. The Defendant has been fully informed of the nature 
and extent of the charges against him, the factual basis 
therefor, and legal principles which the State deems to be 
applicable to his case. His Motion for Bill of Particulars 
should be denied. 
Hz 
DATED this *f~ day of /(rV^m^*^- , 1988. &^ -»-« ~* ^ ^ f ^ w ^ , i| 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
STEPHEN J. SORENSON 
Chief# Litigation Division 
Assistant Attorney General 
7^7^ C^hfrffFr^ZZr 
CREIGHTON C. HORTON II 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for State of Utah 
JsL 
DAVID J. SCHWENDIMAN 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for State of Utah 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
This is to certify that I delivered a copy of the 
foregoing STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT ADDAM SWAPP'S MOTION FOR 
BILL OF PARTICULARS to the following this i2^ day of 
November, 1988: 
John Bucher 
Attorney for Addam W. Swapp 
1518 South 1100 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Earl Spafford 
Attorney for Jonathan R. Swapp 
425 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
G. Fred Metos 
Attorney for John Timothy Singer 
175 East 400 South #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ADDENDUM C 
DAVID L. WILKINSON - 3472 
Attorney General 
STEPHEN J. SORENSON - 3049 
Assistant Attorney General 
Chief, Litigation Division 
CREIGHTON C. HORTON II - 1542 
Assistant Attorney General 
DAVID J. SCHWENDIMAN - 2889 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for State of Utah 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1016 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
-V6-
ADDAM W. SWAPP, 
JONATHAN R. SWAPP, and 
JOHN TIMOTHY SINGER, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM OF AUTHORITY RE: 
: PRINCIPLES OF ACCOMPLICE 
LIABILITY AND OF LEGAL 
CAUSATION 
t Criminal No. 1218 
j Judge Michael R. Murphy 
The State of Utah, by and through Creighton C. Horton 
II, Assistant Attorney General, submits the following memorandum 
of law concerning principles of legal responsibility applicable 
to the above-entitled case. 
I. ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY 
•Every person, acting with the mental state required 
for the commission of an offense who directly commits the 
offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or 
intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which 
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for 
such conduct.- §76-2-202, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
1. Aider and abettor is guilty of the natural and 
reasonable or probable consequences of acts he knowingly aided or 
abetted. People v. Martinez, 48 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1966); State v. 
Murphy, 489 P. 2d 430 (Utah 1971); People v. Durham, 449 P. 2d 
198 (Cal- 1969), cert, denied 23 L. Ed. 2d 755; People v. 
Luparello, 231 Cal. Rptr. 832 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1986). 
2. Aider and abettor is liable for the natural and 
probable consequences of his criminal acts even if he did not 
intend the result. U.S. v. Barnett, 667 F. 2d 835 (9th Cir. 
1982); People v. Luparello, supra. 
3. Whether act committed was a natural and probable 
consequence of an act encouraged and the extent of defendant's 
knowledge are questions of fact for the jury. People v. Durham, 
supra; People v. Luparello, supra, 
4. Where defendants are acting in concert, immaterial 
that other defendant fired fatal shot; shot fired by one fired by 
all. People, v. Bracey, 249 N.E. 2d 224 (111. 1969); Hall v. 
State, 403 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 1981); Riddick v. Comm., 308 S.E. 
2d 117 (Va. 1983). 
5. Defendant is accountable for death of victim where 
he embarks on course of action which was dangerous in character 
and could reasonably be expected to require the use of force that 
might result in the death of a human being. People v. Horton, 
356 N.E. 2d 1044 (111. 1976); People v. Hughes, 185 N.E. 2d 834 
(111. 1962). 
6. If defendant, by agreement, is in position to 
render aid, he is guilty even if he does not participate in the 
actual perpetration of crime. In such circumstances he is not a 
mere onlooker. Comm, v. Soares, 387 N.E. 2d 499 (Mass. 1979). 
7. Only slight participation is required to change a 
person's status from a mere spectator into an aider and abettor. 
Smith v. State, 640 P. 2d 988 (Okla. App. 1982). 
8. Where a defendant deliberately engages in an affray 
and deliberately uses a lethal weapon, the resulting death is 
within defendant's intent as a natural and probable consequence 
if the death is directly attributable to the affray and not to 
some intervening cause. Johnson v. State, 386 P. 2d 336 (Okla. 
1963). 
9. Where defendant acts jointly with others bent on 
illegal acts which are dangerous or homicidal in character, or 
which will probably require use of force that could result in 
taking like unlawfully, he becomes liable for wrongdoings of all 
co-defendants acting in furtherance of common purpose, or as a 
natural or probable consequence thereof, even where defendant 
does not actually participate in overt acts himself. People v. 
Raybourn, 219 N.E. 2d 711 (111. 1966) 
10. One may infer common plan from facts and 
circumstances, including organized conduct before and after the 
killing. People v. Younqblood, 418 N.W. 2d 472 (Mich. 1988); 
People v. Stephens, 301 N.E. 2d 89 (111. 1973); U.S. v. James, 
528 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1976). (Note that in James, supra, the 
defendant, who was the leader of a group claiming to be an 
independent foreign nation, was convicted as an aider and abettor 
in the use of firearms in the commission of a felony even though 
he was not present at the time the shoot-out occurred.) 
11. Jury can look at events before, during, and after 
as well as actions of the parties which show a common design to 
murder the victim. Barron v. State, 566 S.W. 2d 929 (Tex. 1978); 
Santana v. State, 714 S.W. 2d 1 (Tex. 1986). 
12. Where defendants took affirmative steps to arm 
themselves and participate in an escape attempt, a crime 
committed by one to bring about the escape was the act of all. 
People v. Dennis, 284 N.E. 2d 67 (111. 1972). 
13. Where the killing of the victim was a natural and 
probable consequence of a common plan, one may infer defendant's 
intent to kill although a co-defendant may have done the actual 
killing. State v. Nabozny, 375 N.E. 2d 784 (Ohio 1978). 
14. Where aider and abettor's participation in 
criminal acts is major and it is foreseeable that lethal force 
might be used, his reckless indifference to human life is a 
highly culpable mental state akin to acting intentionally for 
purposes of making an Enmund-type death penalty judgment. Tison 
v. Arizona, 107 S. Ct. 1676 (1987). 
15. Where a defendant is a party to a compact of 
criminal conduct which includes within its scope the forcible 
resistance of arrest and where he is also present at the scene 
for the purposes of assisting in its commission, he may be found 
guilty of the murder of a police officer who is killed by an 
accomplice during such joint resistance. People v. Durham, 
supra. 
II. CAUSATION 
Defendants set in motion events the natural and 
probable outcome of which was death. They set the stage for a 
foreseeable and tragic outcome by creating a highly volatile 
situation. 
They knowingly engaged in conduct that created a grave% 
risk of death to another# and the circumstances under which they 
acted, when viewed objectively by a reasonable person, evidenced 
a depraved indifference to human life. $76-5-203(c), Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended; State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d. 1042 
(Utah 1984). (i.e. Defendants' collective armed resistance to law 
enforcement authorities after bombing the church; their refusal 
to allow officers onto the property despite a legal obligation to 
do so after notification of outstanding search and arrest 
warrants; their turning the Singer residence into an armed 
fortress; their moving about the property armed with high powered 
rifles and other deadly weapons; their aiming of weapons and 
firing of shots [by one or more participants] in the direction of 
officers during the siege.) 
1. Firing by Timothy cannot be considered an 
independent intervening cause or an unforeseeable event as it 
pertains to the legal liability of Addam and Jonathan Swapp. 
Timothy's actions were part and parcel of the joint resistance. 
Defendants' own conduct of armed resistance exhibited a conscious 
disregard for life, and the victim's resulting death was highly 
probable. Hence, such conduct caused the death of the victim. 
See People v. Caldwell, 681 P. 2d 274 (Cal. 1984); Mosier v. 
State, 671 P. 2d 62 (Okla. 1983); Pizano v. Superior Court, 577 
P. 2d 659 (Cal. 1978); People v. Gilbert, 408 P. 2d 365 (Cal. 
1966); People v. Claflln, 150 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979); People v.4 
Velasquez, 126 Cal. Rptr. 11 (1976); Jones v. State, 580 S.W. 2d 
329 (Tenn. 1978). 
2. Any person who initiates a battle with deadly 
weapons in the course of committing another criminal offense, 
intentionally and with conscious disregard for life# commits an 
act that is likely to cause death. People v. Gilbert, supra; 
People v. Reed, 75 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1969); People v. Claflin, 
supra; People v. Velasquez, supra 
3. Defendants need not fire first shot in order to 
•initiate" gun battle. People v. Reed, supra; People v. 
Washington, 402 P. 2d 130 (Cal. 1965); Taylor v. Superior Court, 
477 P. 2d 131 (Cal. 1970). 
4. A homicide that is the direct causal result of the 
commission of a felony which is inherently dangerous to human 
life (but not a felony within the felony-murder rule) may 
constitute second degree murder. People v. Schader, 401 P. 2d 
665 (Cal. 1965). 
5. A defendant who acts in a way inherently dangerous 
to human life and who causes others to act or react is guilty of 
murder, as such acts are not independent intervening causes of 
the killing. Jones, v. State, supra; People v. Caldwell, supra; 
Pi2ano v. Superior Court, supra; People v. Washington, supra; 
People v. Claflin, supra; Taylor v. Superior Court, supra; 
People v. Williams, 142 Cal. Rptr. 704 (Cal. App. 1977). 
6. Where events are a foreseeable and natural 
consequence of one's criminal conduct, chain of legal causation 
is unbroken. U.S. v. Lewis, 644 F. Supp. 1391 (W.D. Mich. 1986). 
7. Defendant can be found guilty for murder committed 
by accomplice, though he did not intend to commit murder, where 
murder is a natural, probable and foreseeable consequence of acts 
he put in motion. People v. Luparello, supra. 
DATED this ^ day of ^'I^JUIA<£L<- , 1 988. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
STEPHEN J. SORENSON 
Chief, Litigation Division 
Assistant Attorney General 
DAVID J./SCHWENDIMAN 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for State of Utah 
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1518 South 1100 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Earl Spafford 
Attorney for Jonathan R. Swapp 
425 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM D 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ADDAM W. SWAPP, JOHN TIMOTHY 
SINGER, and JONATHAN SWAPP, 
Defendants. 
SUMMARY DECISION 
CASE NO. 1218 
The court took under advisement and requested briefs on the 
issue of the courtfs discretion under Section 76-3-401(4), Utah 
Code Ann., to apply consecutive sentences. 
Upon consideration of the briefs submitted, the court hereby 
rules that the prohibition of aggregate minimum sentences 
exceeding 12 years in Section 76-3-401(4) is not applicable when 
the sentence of the first sentencing court is a determinate 
sentence. See People v. Dye, 69 111.2d 298, 371 N.E.2d 630, 633-
34 (1977). 
The sentences of each defendant in Federal Court were 
determinate sentences and were not rendered otherwise by the 
federal statute allowing good time. The sentences to be 
considered under Section 76-3-401(4), Utah Code Ann., are those 
actually imposed by the first sentencing court and not the range 
of terms which the first sentencing court has as alternatives 
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prior to imposition of a determinate sentence. Consequently, 
these sentences are not to be considered in determining the 
aggregate minimum sentences under Section 76-3-401(4), Utah Code 
Ann. 
While the court is of the view that a proper consideration 
of the federal sentencing scheme resolves the issue concerning 
aggregate minimums, further comment and construction of Section 
76-3-401(4) is appropriate. 
In determining whether consecutive sentences may and should 
be imposed, a court is governed by Subsections 76-3-401(l)-(3), 
which set forth the authority and factors for imposing 
consecutive sentences. The first phrase of Subsection 76-3-
401(4) expressly indicates that it is invoked only if the court 
has already "lawfully determined to impose consecutive 
sentences." The succeeding language concerning limitations on 
aggregate minimums and aggregate maximums, then, does not limit 
the courtfs discretion in imposing consecutive sentences but 
merely dictates the effect of such sentences. For example, if 
the federal sentences in this case had to be considered in 
calculating aggregate minimums under Subsection 76-3-401(4), one 
alternative effect of a consecutive 1 to 15 year state sentence 
could be that it would begin to run concurrent with the federal 
sentence after the eleventh year. 
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While the court need not address such issues in this case# 
it is clear that Subsection 76-3-401(4) addresses the effect of 
consecutive sentences and does not prohibit consecutive sentences 
when the aggregate minimum is exceeded by reason of the 
imposition of a consecutive sentence. This construction of 
Subsection 76-3-401(4) is consistent with the directions to the 
Board of Pardons in Subsection 76-3-401(6) in "determining the 
effect of consecutive sentences," (Emphasis added). 
If any of the defendants view the construction of Subsection 
76-3-401(4) in this Summary Decision to be erroneous and its 
effect is the imposition of an unlawful sentence, their remedy is 
a direct appeal at this time. Absent a contrary construction of 
the statute by subsequent binding precedent, the doctrine of res 
judicata and the law of the case will require any other judge of 
this court to deny a request to correct any of the sentences 
under Section 77-35-22(e), Utah Code Ann., whether presented by 
the Board of Pardons, a motion by a defendant in this case or 
collateral attack. Furthermore, if not challenged now by direct 
appeal, it is arguable that a challenge hereafter under Section 
77-35-22(e) has been waived. 
Dated this 26th day of January, 1989. 
MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, : JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
AND COMMITMENT 
-V8-
: Case No. 1218 
ADDAM W. SWAPP, 
: Judge Michael R. Murphy 
Defendant. 
On December 22, 1988, the Defendant, Addam W. Swapp, 
was -found guilty by a jury of the offense of Manslaughter, a 
Second Degree Felony, a lesser included offense of that charged 
in the Information, and the Court adjudged the Defendant guilty 
of that offense. 
At the request of the Court, counsel for the State and 
for the Defendant submitted sentencing memoranda, and on January 
19/ 1989, a sentencing hearing was held before the Court. 
Defendant was present and represented by counsel, John Bucher. 
The State was represented by Creighton C. Horton II, Assistant 
Attorney General, and by David J. Schwendiman, Special Assistant 
Attorney General. After the hearing, sentencing was continued 
for one week pending the submission of additional memoranda by 
counsel for the State and for the Defendant. 
On January 26, 1989, Defendant was present before the 
Court and represented by counsel, John Bucher. The State was 
represented by Creighton C. Horton II, Assistant Attorney 
General, and by David J. Schwendiman, Special Assistant Attorney 
General. The Court, having disposed of all legal issues and 
having rendered its Sentencing Decision and Order on January 26, 
1989, hereby makes and enters the following Judgment, Sentence 
and Commitment: 
JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Defendant, Addam W. Swapp, has been convicted and is guilty of 
the crime of Manslaughter, a Second Degree Felony, a lesser 
included offense of that charged in the Information. The Court 
having asked whether there was any legal or other reason why 
sentence should not be imposed, and no sufficient cause to the 
contrary being shown or appearing to the Court, it is adjudged 
that the Defendant is guilty of Manslaughter, a Second Degree 
Felony. 
SENTENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED AND ORDERED that the Defendant be 
confined and imprisoned at the Utah State Prison for a term of 
not less than one year nor more than 15 years as provided by law 
for the crime of Manslaughter, a Second Degree Felony, which term 
shall run consecutively to and at the end of any and all 
determinate sentences imposed in United States v. Addam W. Swapp, 
Case No. 88-CR-006J, United States District Court for the 
District of Utah, with the limitation, however, that, in 
accordance with Section 76-3-401(4), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended, the aggregate maximum term of all sentences imposed in 
this case and the above-referenced federal case shall in no event 
exceed thirty (30) years. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant be given 
credit for time served in state custody since the execution of 
the Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum in this case to the 
extent credit therefor is not applied to the Defendant's sentence 
in the the above-referenced federal case; the determination of 
the amount of credit due, if any, shall be made by the Board of 
Pardons consistent with this order and the Court's Sentencing 
Decision and Order of January 26, 1989. 
COMMITMENT 
IT IS ORDERED that, at the time the Defendant, Addam W. 
Swapp, is released from federal custody, the Sheriff of Summit 
County or his authorized representative shall deliver said 
defendant without delay to the Utah State Prison, Draper, Utah, 
where he shall then and there be confined and imprisoned in 
accordance with the above Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment. 
DATED this Zjr^ day of Qduuc*^ , 1989. yiA^uA^^i 
4-
4ICHJ 
MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
District Court Judge 
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